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Summary
The ability to recognize other individuals’ mental states—
their knowledge and beliefs, for example—is a fundamental
part of human cognition and may be unique to our species.
Tests of a ‘‘theory of mind’’ in animals have yielded conflict-
ing results [1–3]. Some nonhuman primates can read others’
intentions and know what others see, but they may not
understand that, in others, perception can lead to knowledge
[1–3]. Using an alarm-call-based field experiment, we show
that chimpanzees were more likely to alarm call in response
to a snake in the presence of unaware group members than
in the presence of aware group members, suggesting that
they recognize knowledge and ignorance in others. We
monitored the behavior of 33 individuals to a model viper
placed on their projected travel path. Alarm calls were signif-
icantly more common if the caller was with group members
who had either not seen the snake or had not been present
when alarm calls were emitted. Other factors, such as own
arousal, perceived risk, or risk to receivers, did not signifi-
cantly explain the likelihood of calling, although they did
affect the call rates. Our results suggest that chimpanzees
monitor the information available to other chimpanzees
and control vocal production to selectively inform them.Results and Discussion
Recent experiments have demonstrated that animals can
understand some of the perceptual or motivational states of
others, specifically what they see or intend to do (chimpanzees
[4, 5]; monkeys [6, 7]; ravens [8]). What has remained unclear
so far is whether the ability to understand and act on others’
field of vision or their intentions is the result of reading their
behavior or of attributing knowledge, a cognitively more com-
plex process [1–3, 9]. Previous investigations have typically
been based on food paradigms, whereby another’s ability to
see food was equated with its intention to acquire it, which
has made it difficult to disentangle intention and perception
from knowledge [9]. Alarm-calling behavior provides a useful
alternative way of investigating the ability of primates to attri-
bute knowledge. A seemingly costly and altruistic behavior,
callers should take into account whether their alarm calls are
likely to benefit someone else. There are good theoretical
reasons for why individuals should alert other group members4These authors contributed equally to this work
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(R.M.W.)to the presence of danger [10, 11], but little is known about the
underlying cognition of such behavior. So far, the only well-
established fact is that alarm-call production is influenced by
audience composition. For instance, many species produce
alarm calls only in the presence of a conspecific (chickens
[12]; social mongooses [13]; primates [14]), whereas some
require the presence of a particular audience (kin versus non-
kin [15, 16]). In primates, there is evidence that individuals also
assess the behavior or risk experienced by others during
alarm-call production [17, 18]. However, whether alarm calling
is further influenced by others’ knowledge is currently un-
known. For example, baboon mothers do not reply to their
offspring’s lost call (to facilitate reunification), which has
been interpreted as an inability to attribute mental states [19].
When confronted with danger, wild chimpanzees pro-
duce two basic types of vocal responses: loud alarm barks
and ‘‘SOS’’ screams (typically given after identifying a deadly
ambush threat, such as a leopard, python, or neighboring
chimpanzee community [20, 21]) or quiet ‘‘alert hoos’’ (typically
given to less serious threats but with an ambush-like com-
ponent, such as snares, highly poisonous vipers, or fresh feces
from neighboring chimpanzees or leopards [20]; see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures 1 available online). Unlike
with the loud alarm calls, snakes have not been observed to
move away during quiet alert hoo production. Indeed, it is
unlikely that signalers derive immediate benefits from emitting
these calls. Rather, alert hoos are acoustically distinct calls
that consistently elicit cryptic behavior in receivers, such as
silent, cautious approach or silent avoidance behavior (C.C.,
R.M.W., and K.Z., unpublished data). Vipers are highly camou-
flaged and can remain static for weeks (Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures 2). They have been observed to prey on
smaller primates and, if trodden on, can respond with a deadly
bite [22]. Thus, although these snakes are not predators
of chimpanzees, they are nevertheless highly dangerous to
them. Providing information about the presence and specific
location of a viper will thus be valuable to others. At the
same time, vocal production is costly and may be inhibited if
it attracts the attention of predators or hostile individuals
from the same or a neighboring group [20, 23]. Taken together,
we suggest that costs of calling in situations with a potential
ambush threat may be offset by producing a low-amplitude
signal when it most benefits receivers, specifically when
receivers are unaware of the threat.
Alert hoo production in response to vipers thus offers
a possibility to test whether chimpanzee alert hoo production
is influenced by receivers’ knowledge. To this end, we de-
signed a field experiment in which a subject encountered
a motionless but potentially harmful viper model in the
presence of others. We made two predictions in relation to
our main hypothesis, that is, that alert hoo production is
moderated by how much it benefits the receivers. First, if
receivers’ knowledge state influences alert hoo production,
we expected subjects to call less when all receivers were
aware of the snake compared to when at least one receiver
was still naive. A second prediction was in relation to the
callers’ own previous experience with the snake model. Under
field conditions, it was impossible to systematically control for
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143subjects’ experience with the snake. Hence, alarm-call pro-
duction could have been a mere effect of prior exposure, or
habituation, to the snake [24, 25]. Here, we predicted that the
subjects’ calling behavior was influenced by receivers’ knowl-
edge state, irrespective of their own previous experience with
the snake.
Chimpanzees Take Receiver Knowledge into Account
We observed the responses of members of the Sonso com-
munity of Budongo Forest, Uganda, to a snake model posi-
tioned on their projected path of travel (Figures S1 and S2).
n = 33 different individuals saw one of three snake models
(males: n = 8 adults, n = 7 subadults, n = 1 juvenile; females:
n = 8 adults, n = 8 subadults, n = 1 juvenile; individuals < 6 years
old were excluded from analysis). Chimpanzees typically for-
age in small ‘‘parties,’’ i.e., subgroups with regularly changing
compositions such that some individuals may not see others
for hours or days. Because it was not possible to control the
composition of these parties, individuals could serve both as
subjects and receivers across the different trials.
We presented snake models 22 times, with each presenta-
tion lasting several hours, which resulted in n = 111 encoun-
ters. Individuals saw a snake model 1–6 times (mean = 2.8).
Twenty-two of thirty-three chimpanzees produced alert hoos
in response to seeing a model in 46 of 111 encounters
(41.4%) and produced ‘‘alarm barks’’ in 3 of 111 encounters
(2.7%). In contrast, only 1 of 21 chimpanzees (1 of 42 or 2.4%
of encounters) produced alert hoos without seeing the snake
but after hearing another group member produce alert hoos
in response to the snake. Finally, chimpanzees that had previ-
ously seen the snake but could no longer see it alarm called in
3 of 18 encounters (16.7%). Motivation to produce alert hoos
may thus be stimulated by seeing the snake (Supplemental
Experimental Procedures 9).
Hence, for each trial, any individual who was able to see the
snake was termed a ‘‘subject,’’ whereas all other individuals
present within 50 m of the snake model were termed ‘‘re-
ceivers.’’ Typically, a party of chimpanzees encountered
the snake model as they climbed in or out of a food tree or
traveled along a path. The first chimpanzee to see the snake
was called the ‘‘detector.’’ In these cases, subjects and re-
ceivers had no prior exposure to the snake model on that
day (31 of 111 cases). In the remaining 80 of 111 cases, sub-
jects saw the snake after another chimpanzee had already
detected the snake. In these cases, subjects and receivers
usually had some prior exposure to the snake model, having
already seen the snake or heard alert hoos. This typically
occurred when chimpanzees followed behind a detector,
climbed back down a large food tree after feeding, or traveled
back along the same path later in the day.
From the moment the first alert hoo was produced, all indi-
viduals within earshot (50 m) were considered ‘‘knowledge-
able’’ (46 of 111 cases). Individuals who arrived more than
3 min later and were not part of the initial party when the
alert hoo was produced were considered ‘‘ignorant’’ (5 of
111 cases). Interestingly, subjects resumed calling as new
group members came into view in 3 of 5 cases, independent
of the latency since the last call produced (range 5–45 min).
Those considered to have ‘‘heard’’ an alert hoo retained their
knowledgeable status for the remainder of the day. Thus,
receivers were still considered knowledgeable if they were
present when the last alert hoo was produced hours earlier
(17.7 6 32.4 min, mean 6 SD), even if they themselves had
not seen the snake.Subject Information and Receiver Information
From the subject’s perspective, others’ knowledge about the
snake fell into three categories: (1) ignorant receivers (no expo-
sure to the snake), (2) partially knowledgeable receivers (heard
alert hoos but had not seen the location of snake), or (3) fully
knowledgeable receivers (had seen the location of snake;
Table S1 and Supplemental Experimental Procedures 4).
As mentioned before, the subjects themselves could have
(1) no prior knowledge of the snake (detectors; 31 of 111 cases)
or (2) prior knowledge of the snake (heard alert hoos or had
seen snake; 80 of 111 cases). Because prior experience might
have influenced calling behavior (for example, as a result of
habituation [24, 25]), we included this variable in the analysis.
Possible confounding variables that might influence subjects’
calling behavior were (a–c) level of threat to subject, (d–f) audi-
ence composition, (g–i) level of threat to receivers, (j) prior
exposure to alert hoos, and (k and l) prior exposure to snake
(Table S1).
To test the relative explanatory power of the key predictor
variables, Receiver Information and Subject Information, and
possible confound variables (a)–(j) on subjects’ alarm-calling
behavior, we ran two sets of generalized linear mixed models
(GLMMs). In each set of models, we tested predictor variables
against one of two response variables (Call or Not Call and
Number of Calls). Colinearity between predictor variables
within each model was low (maximum variance inflation
factor = 2.57), apart from Subject Information and Receiver
Information (i.e., whether or not subjects or receivers were
already aware of the snake), which were highly correlated
(Spearman’s r > 0.60). Thus, we ran parallel analyses for
Subject Information and Receiver Information.
Initially, we ran the full sample size (111 cases) for each
response variable with predictor variables Subject Information
or Receiver Information and possible confound variables
(a)–(h) and (j). However, because Receiver Approach (variable
i) had values for only 100 of 111 encounters, we ran a reduced
data set of 100 cases for both response variables, which
allowed us to include the predictor variable Receiver Approach
(Table S2).
We found that the key variables, Receiver Information and
Subject Information (whether receivers and subjects were
already aware of the snake, either by having seen it or by
having heard alert hoos), were the only predictors showing
significance or a trend in all models (Figure 1; Tables 1
and S1; Supplemental Experimental Procedures 5).
Additional predictor variables were significant in different
models (Supplemental Experimental Procedures 7). In models
with response variable Call or Not Call, the only other signifi-
cant predictor was Subject Closer Than Receivers. In models
with response variable Number of Calls, two other variables
were consistently significant: Strong Bond Partner Present
and Subject Startled (Tables 1 and S2). Equally relevant, the
predictors Subject Total Model Encounters, Subject Distance
to Snake, Receiver Distance to Snake, Number of Receivers,
and Number of Dominant Receivers did not contribute sig-
nificantly to the response variables in any model (Tables 1
and S2), indicating that any influence they may have on calling
behavior is less pronounced than that of the significant vari-
ables in these models (Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures 7).
Prior Snake Experience as a Possible Confound
Because Receiver Information and Subject Information were
confounded, we ran a third set of models to distinguish which
Figure 1. Influence of Receiver Information on Subjects’ Likelihood to Emit
Alert Hoos upon Seeing the Snake Model
Black indicates no alarm calls produced; gray indicates at least one alarm
call produced. ‘‘Receiver information’’ indicates receiver ignorance or
knowledge from the perspective of the subject, divided into the following
three categories. ‘‘Seen’’ indicates knowledgeable receivers: the subject
had seen all receivers see the snake model. ‘‘Heard’’ indicates partially
knowledgeable receivers: the subject had heard an alarm call when all
receivers were within 50 m of the snake model but could not have seen all
receivers see the snake model. ‘‘Ignorant’’ indicates that the subject could
not have seen all receivers see the snake and had not heard an alert hoo
when all current receivers were within earshot (50 m) of the alert hoo.
Table 1. Effect of Receiver Information and Other Predictor Variables on
Chimpanzee Alert Hoo Production upon Seeing a Snake Model
Predictor Variables Estimate SE z p
Response Variable: Call or Not Call
Intercept 20.33 1.50 20.22 0.825
Receiver Information 20.96 0.44 22.17 0.030**
Subject Total Model Encounters 20.73 0.45 21.64 0.101
Subject Startled 0.11 0.80 0.14 0.886
Subject Distance to Snake 20.22 0.36 20.62 0.534
Latency since Last Call 0.70 0.73 0.95 0.341
Strong Bond Partner Present 0.71 0.55 1.29 0.198
Number of Receivers 20.22 0.46 20.48 0.631
Number of Dominant Receivers 0.19 0.40 0.46 0.644
Receiver Distance to Snake 0.08 0.34 0.25 0.804
Subject Closer Than Receivers 1.15 0.61 1.87 0.062*
Response Variable: Number of Calls
Intercept 0.83 0.52 1.61 0.107
Receiver Information 20.50 0.14 23.63 0.000**
Subject Total Model Encounters 20.07 0.14 20.50 0.618
Subject Startled 0.48 0.20 2.38 0.017**
Subject Distance to Snake 20.09 0.11 20.82 0.412
Latency since Last Call 20.28 0.24 21.17 0.242
Strong Bond Partner Present 0.72 0.16 4.38 0.000**
Number of Receivers 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.99
Number of Dominant Receivers 0.09 0.17 0.55 0.581
Receiver Distance to Snake 20.01 0.10 20.11 0.911
Subject Closer Than Receivers 0.32 0.21 1.56 0.118
Receiver Information indicates receivers’ prior exposure to snake-related
stimuli, from the perspective of the subject. Models were run with different
response variables: Call or Not Call (top) and Number of Calls (bottom). Both
models included all 111 cases and predictor variables (a)–(h) and (j). Both
models were repeated with Subject Information replacing highly correlated
Receiver Information and obtaining very similar results. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05.
See Table S1 for predictor variable definitions and predictions. As a result of
the rarity of snake model presentation opportunities, our criteria for inde-
pendence of data points were as follows: (1) a chimpanzee who sights the
snake model becomes a subject or (2) a new receiver arrives within 50 m
of the snake model. A maximum of two simultaneous subjects were
included as data points (the two closest to the snake) until either could no
longer see the snake. This led to n = 111 subject ‘‘encounters’’ from 33 chim-
panzees during 22 snake model presentations (mean 6 SD: duration of
snake presentations, 110.5 6 60.4 min; duration of subject encounters,
5.25 6 8.4 min; number of receivers across 111 encounters, 7.2 6 5.2). To
control for pseudoreplication, three random factors were included in each
model: Subject’s Identity, Snake Model used (model 1, 2, or 3) and Model
Presentation Event (with each event lasting up to one day) (Supplemental
Experimental Procedures 7).
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144of these were driving calling behavior. Specifically, we asked
whether subjects’ calling behavior was principally influenced
by their own previous exposure, or habituation, to the snake,
as opposed to their awareness of receivers’ knowledge about
the snake. To control for subjects’ differing levels of prior
snake exposure, we only included cases where both subjects
and receivers were previously aware of the snake model
(Supplemental Experimental Procedures 5). In addition, to
minimize confounds from other significant variables, we only
included cases where receivers were further away from the
snake than subjects and receivers were approaching the
snake (n = 15 subjects, 30 cases).
In these cases, Receiver Information varied, with some
receivers having heard alert hoos only (no knowledge of loca-
tion) and others having seen the snake (knowledge of location).
We thus included the predictor variable Receiver Information
and two measures of subjects’ prior exposure to the snake,
Subject Already Called (subjects had or had not previously
produced alert hoos) and Duration of Subject Exposure [time
since subject was first aware of the snake until the subject
saw the snake on this occasion: median (quartiles) 8.0 (1.3,
64.25) min; variables (k) and (l); Table 2].
We ran two models with both response variables and
crucially found that only Receiver Information was significant
in each model (Table 2), indicating that subjects’ calling
behavior was primarily influenced by the knowledge state of
receivers, and not by subjects’ own prior experience with the
snakemodel (Supplemental Experimental Procedures 5 and6).
Finally, observers’ sex and age class influenced neither the
likelihood of calling (two-way analysis of variance [ANOVA]:
sex: F1,29 = 0.27, p = 0.609; age: F1,29 = 0.06, p = 0.811; interac-
tion: F1,28 = 0.06, p = 0.811) nor the average number of calls
produced (two-way ANOVA: sex: F1,29 = 0.003, p = 0.96; age:
F1,29 = 0.51, p = 0.480; interaction: F1,28 = 0.67, p = 0.419)
(Supplemental Experimental Procedures 7).Factors Influencing the Likelihood of Alarm Calling
Upon seeing the snake model, the likelihood of alarm calling
(Call or Not Call) did not depend on subjects’ own perceived
risk or level of habituation, receiver composition, or receivers’
level of risk (Supplemental Experimental Procedures 6). Signif-
icant effects were found for Receiver Information (and a trend
for Subject Closer Than Receivers). Model estimates showed
that, for Receiver Information, subjects were less likely to
call with increasing information available to receivers about
the specificity of the danger. As shown in our first analysis,
subjects calledmost if receivers had no exposure to the snake.
They called less if receivers had heard alert hoos, and they
called least if receivers had seen the snake model, suggesting
that they took into account how much information receivers
had about the type and position of the danger (Table 1;
Figure 1). Model estimates for Subject Closer Than Receivers
showed that subjects called more when they were closer to
the snake than any receiver. This was not correlated to their
Table 2. Influence of Subjects’ Prior Exposure and Receivers’ Knowledge
on Chimpanzee Alert Hoo Production when Seeing the Snake Model
Predictor Variables Estimate SE z p
Response Variable: Call or Not Call
Intercept 20.81 1.31 20.61 0.539
Receiver Information 22.97 1.25 22.37 0.018**
Subject Already Called 1.77 1.20 1.47 0.142
Duration of Subject Exposure 0.20 0.22 0.87 0.384
Response Variable: Number of Calls
Intercept 1.33 0.37 3.61 0.000
Receiver Information 21.19 0.29 24.03 0.000**
Subject Already Called 0.32 0.26 1.24 0.215
Duration of Subject Exposure 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.987
Both models included 30 cases where subject and receivers had prior
information about the snake (i.e., they had already heard alert hoos and
may or may not have seen the snake). Thus, no cases are included in this
model when subjects were the first to detect the snake. Likewise, Receiver
Information included only ‘‘heard’’ and ‘‘seen’’ cases, and no ‘‘ignorant’’
cases. Different response variables were used for each: Call or Not Call
(top) and Number of Calls (bottom). **p < 0.05. Subject Already Called
(y/n): subject had or had not already produced alert hoos to the snake
model, variable (k); Duration of Subject Exposure (min): time since subject
was first aware of snake until subject saw the snake on this occasion
(median [quartiles]: 8.0 [1.3, 64.25] min), variable (l). See Table S1 for full
variable definitions and predictions.
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145own or the receivers’ absolute distance to the snake and thus
suggests that subjects made an assessment of their relative
proximity to the snake before calling.
Factors Influencing the Amount of Calling
Compared to the likelihood of calling (Call or Not Call),
the response variable Number of Calls was significantly influ-
enced by Subject Startled and when Strong Social Bond
Partners were among receivers, in addition to Receiver Infor-
mation (Tables 1 and S2). Startle responses, which typically
occur across animals within <100 ms of a stimulus [26, 27],
were temporally dissociated from the production of alert
hoos. Alert hoos were emitted 1.70 6 0.4 s (mean 6 SD) after
having seen the snake and 0.91 6 0.63 s after the end of the
startle response, suggesting that alert hoos are not compo-
nents of the startle response, nor necessarily of heightened
arousal as is frequently assumed by some authors (e.g., [28]).
The ‘‘social bond’’ effect suggests that, like other species
[15], chimpanzees aremoremotivated to call if they can benefit
valuable group members.
In one model, two extra variables were significant, when
receivers were approaching the snake (Receiver Approach)
and when the Latency since Last Call was relatively long
(Table S2). The Receiver Approach effect suggests that sub-
jects perceived others’ intentions to pass close by the snake
(and their forthcoming exposure to danger). Again, receivers’
absolute distance to the snake had no effect, further suggest-
ing that subjects assessed others’ intentions and implied risk,
regardless of the caller’s own prior experience with the snake.
Conclusions and Implications
We have shown that chimpanzee alarm-calling behavior was
driven not only by perceived danger but also bywhether others
were aware of the danger. The likelihood of calling was not
related to the subjects’ or receivers’ perceived risk, was inde-
pendent of receiver composition, and was not primarily driven
by subjects’ habituation to snake-related stimuli. Once a chim-
panzee began alarm calling, the number of calls produced wassubject to additional influences. Personal risk, risk to a
valuable receiver, and risky behavior by a receiver all had
enhancing effects, which is in line with other alarm-call studies
showing that the strength of the alarm-calling response is
influenced by the risk faced by subjects or receivers [14–18].
The fact that alarm-call production was more likely when
receivers had less information about the danger has not
been documented before. Unlike alarm-call systems in other
species, it implies that chimpanzees keep track of information
available to receivers and intentionally inform those who lack
certain knowledge. It is known that monkeys are adept at
keeping track of their own and others’ relationships, that
they remember details of specific interactions that happened
some minutes ago, and that they make inferences about cur-
rent interactions based on the recent memory of previous
ones [1, 6, 29, 30]. Here, our results indicate that chimpanzees
keep track of what others can or cannot have seen and heard
and communicate missing information that is relevant and
beneficial to receivers. These results extend the current litera-
ture in four ways. First, they challenge current opinion that it is
unlikely that nonhuman animals integrate recognition that
others are ignorant with provision of the missing information
through communication [31]. Second, our study is in line with
recent studies suggesting that chimpanzees have a degree
of volitional control over vocal production ([23, 32, 33], but
see [28]). Third, there is mixed support suggesting that chim-
panzees exhibit prosocial behavior (for, [34, 35]; against,
[36]). Here we show that chimpanzee vocal behavior is influ-
enced by a prosocial motivation, namely intentionally in-
forming others of danger. Finally, our results are particularly
relevant to debates about the role of mental state attribution
in the evolution of language. Some scientists have argued
that a crucial stage in this evolution occurred when individuals
began producing vocalizations with the goal of informing and
thereby reducing ignorance in others [37, 38].
Experimental Procedures
Subjects and Vocal and Behavioral Observations
R.M.W. and C.C. collected data from the habituated Sonso community
in the Budongo Forest, Uganda, from February 2008 to July 2010 (www.
budongo.org). We manufactured three models of dangerous venomous
snakes familiar to the chimpanzees, two gaboon vipers (Bitis gabonica)
and one rhinoceros viper (Bitis nasicornis), using wire mesh, plaster, acrylic
paint, and varnish (Figure S2 andSupplemental Experimental Procedures 2).
We recorded hoo calls during snake encounters using Marantz PMD660
solid-state recorders and Sennheiser MKH416 and MKH418 directional
microphones. Social dominance relationships were determined via pant-
grunting vocalizations, a reliable indicator of subordinance in chimpanzees
[20]. Males and females were assigned as high, mid, or low ranking. We
calculated subject’s strong social bond partners using relative rates of affili-
ative and aggressive behaviors in a derivative of the composite sociality
index (Supplemental Experimental Procedures 8).
Experimental Design
In pilot trials, we found that models of gaboon and rhinoceros vipers con-
sistently triggered vocal behavior with alert hoos only (Figure S1; Movies
S1 and S2). Experiments were conducted between September 2008 and
December 2009 and between April and July 2010. During this period, we
successfully presented a snake model on 22 different occasions. We kept
presentations within the natural rate of encounters in which human ob-
servers saw these snake species (natural rate: mean = 1.8 per month, range
0–15; Supplemental Experimental Procedures 2).
Experimental Trials
For each trial, two human observers were within 10 m of the model while
two or three others awaited the chimpanzees 50–100m away on anticipated
approach paths. Motorola GP340 radios were used to update human
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146observers on all relevant movements and changes in party composition. All
approaching individuals were video recorded with a Panasonic DV video
camera. For each trial, we noted (1) the time of arrival and departure of all
individuals within a 50 m and 100 m range (maximum range that subjects
could see receivers or only hear alert hoos, respectively), (2) individuals’
identity, (3) their absolute and (4) relative distance to the snake model after
snake model detection, (5) the time of snake model detection, and (6) the
vocal behavior of all individuals within a 50 m radius of the snake (Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures 3).
Analysis of the Effect of Observer and Receiver Behavior on Alarm Call
Production
Video recordingswere analyzedwithAdobePremier software andcombined
with direct observational data and audio recordings (Movies S1 and S2). We
ran GLMMs in R (version 2.11.1) using the function lmer provided by the R
package lme4 [39] (Supplemental Experimental Procedures 7).
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes two figures, two tables, twomovies, and
Supplemental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article
online at doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.11.053.
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